FROM AUSTRIA TO SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRANKFURTER\u27S  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS  THEORY by Gumina, Joseph
Western New England Law Review
Volume 30 30 (2007-2008)
Issue 2 Article 3
1-1-2008
FROM AUSTRIA TO SACCO AND




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Gumina, FROM AUSTRIA TO SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRANKFURTER'S "FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS" THEORY, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 389 (2008), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/3
FROM AUSTRIA TO SACCO AND VANZETTI: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRANKFURTER'S 
"FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS" THEORY 
JOSEPH GUMINA* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of July 1, 1949, three Los Angeles County dep­
uty sheriffs stormed into the home of Antonio Richard Rochin 
who, they believed, was selling narcotics.1 They forced their way 
into Rochin's bedroom where they found him and his wife half­
dressed on the bed.2 Two cellophane-wrapped pills sat in plain view 
on a nearby nightstand.3 When one of the officers asked, "Whose 
stuff is this?," Rochin grabbed the pills and swallowed them.4 All 
three officers jumped on him and tried to pry the capsules from his 
mouth.s Officer Jack Jones throttled Rochin's neck and shoved his 
fingers down Rochin's throat, but to no avai1.6 Rochin was then 
placed in handcuffs and taken to a hospital where, at the officers' 
direction, a doctor forced a tube in Rochin's mouth and adminis­
tered an emetic solution, causing vomiting.? The officers retrieved 
the capsules and subsequent testing revealed them to contain mor­
phine.8 In Rochin's trial for possessing "a preparation of mor­
* JD, 2007, Boston University School of Law; BA, 2003, College of William & 
Mary; law clerk to the Honorable Andrew J. Smithson of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey. The author dedicates this Article to his family for their unwavering love and 
support and to Judge Smithson for his inspiration and mentorship over the past several 
months. Special thanks are due to Professor David J. Seipp who provided invaluable 
guidance in the editing process, and to the staff of the Western New England Law Re­
view who worked tirelessly to prepare this Article for publication. The opinions ex­
pressed herein are those of the author alone. 
1. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952), overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
2. [d. 
3. [d.; MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND IN­
DIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 161 (John Milton Cooper, Jr., ed., 1991). 
4. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
5. [d. 
6. People v. Rochin, 225 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950), rev'd, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952). 
7. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
8. [d. 
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phine," the two capsules were admitted over his objections and 
constituted the prosecution's primary evidence against him. He was 
convicted and received a sentence of two months in prison.9 
After numerous appeals, the case arrived at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, where Rochin, the petitioner, argued that the methods of the 
Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs deprived him of due process of 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The warrantless entrance 
into his home almost certainly constituted a violation of Rochin's 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures as well, but the Court in Wolf v. Colorado had expressly 
declined to apply the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle 
to state criminal proceedings.u The only issue before the Rochin 
Court, therefore, was the scope and nature of the protections pro­
vided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 
The Rochin case concentrated the Court's attention once again 
on a debate that had raged among justices and legal scholars since 
the beginning of the century: the scope of "incorporation."13 Rati­
fied in 1868, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."14 Jurists and scholars in the 
first part of the twentieth century debated the extent to which this 
language "incorporates" the Bill of Rights so that its guarantees ap­
ply as forcefully to the states as they do to the federal govern­
mentIS The origins of this "incorporation" debate trace back to 
Gitlow v. New York, in which the Supreme Court held that First 
Amendment free speech protections are enforceable against the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
In the wake of Gitlow, two schools of thought emerged con­
cerning the extent and nature of "incorporation." One theory, 
championed by Justice Hugo Black, advocated "total incorpora­
tion"-that is, a blanket incorporation of the first eight Amend­
9. Id. 
10. See id. at 168. 
11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). The Court would not incorporate the exclusionary rule as an essential 
corollary to the Fourth Amendment until nearly a decade later in Mapp. 
12. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. 
13. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 4.02 (4th ed. 
2006). 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
15. DRESSLER, supra note 13, § 4.02. 
16. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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ments of the Bill of Rights via the Due Process ClauseY A 
competing theory, advanced by Justice Benjamin Cardozo and then 
his replacement on the bench, Justice Felix Frankfurter, provided 
that the Due Process Clause enshrines only "fundamental rights"­
that is, "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and con­
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. "18 This view 
is at once more restrictive and expansive than its "total incorpora­
tion" counterpart. While it does not automatically apply all the 
protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights to the states, the "fun­
damental rights" doctrine recognizes the existence of implied 
rights-i.e., rights not specifically provided for in the first eight 
amendments.19 
Justice Frankfurter wrote for a unanimous court in Rochin. 
His opinion provided his most meticulous explanation of the "fun­
damental rights" theory of the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment-an answer, probably, to the challenge 
presented by Justices Black and Douglas in their stinging concur­
ring opinions.20 Two themes surface in Frankfurter's elucidation of 
"fundamental rights" that run through much of his due process ju­
risprudence. First and foremost is Frankfurter's general belief that 
fair process is the essence of justice, a belief that was reinforced by 
his experience as an immigrant and as a minority. Second is Frank­
furter's recourse to reason and empiricism to adduce which "princi­
ple[s] of justice" have gained general acceptance in modern 
society.21 These thematic threads have their origins in Frankfurter's 
early life: his early childhood in Austria, his upbringing by Jewish 
parents, and his unshakeable sense, as he rose through the echelons 
of American society, that he was forever an "outsider." This Arti­
cle uses Frankfurter's Rochin opinion as a launching point to ex­
plore each of these threads.22 
17. DRESSLER, supra note 13, § 4.02; CLYDE E. JACOBS, JUSTICE FRANKFURTER 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 206-07 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1974) (1961). 
18. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled on other grounds 
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
19. DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 2-5. 
20. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 202-03. 
21. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 97. 
22. This Article analyzes Frankfurter's life thematically, not chronologically. For 
a chronological presentation of all the events discussed in this paper, see appendix C. 
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I. ESSENCE OF LIBERTY 
In Rochin, Frankfurter noted that the Due Process Clause em­
bodies a civilized society's most basic "canons of decency."23 Ten 
years earlier, he wrote that "[t]he history of liberty has largely been 
the history of observance of procedural safeguards."24 Frank­
furter's view of "fair procedure [as] the essence of justice"25 is one 
that likely has its genesis in his early professional development, and 
may even have roots in his childhood. Much of Frankfurter's con­
tribution to constitutional jurisprudence relates to due process, 
which is evidenced by his pivotal role in the "incorporation" de­
bate. This section explores the ways in which Frankfurter's early 
career and experiences as an immigrant and a Jew might have 
caused him to assign special significance to due process as an indis­
pensable ingredient of liberty. 
A. From Austria to America 
Felix Frankfurter was born in 1882 in Vienna, Austria, to Jew­
ish parents, the third of six children.26 Michael E. Parrish's biogra­
phy of the Justice provides a colorful description of Vienna in the 
late 1800s: 
The Vienna of Emperor Francis Joseph, a city of bright cafes 
in a nation of peasants, nourished the genius of Sigmund Freud, 
Gustav Mahler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Ernest Mach, and Ar­
nold Schonberg. During the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury, Hapsburg Vienna experienced a burst of intellectual and 
artistic creativity unsurpassed by any metropolis in the world .... 
Frankfurter's immediate contemporaries included the novelist, 
Robert Musil, the literary critic, George Lukacs, the theologian, 
Paul Tillich, and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Yet this 
extraordinary cultural flowering took place within an economic, 
social, and political environment of unrelieved chaos and futility 
27 
Exposure to the city's vibrant culture may have nurtured Fe­
lix's intellect, but it was his family, particularly his Uncle Solomon, 
23. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
24. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
25. See H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 57 (1981). 
26. [d. at 12; HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE 
BENCH 3-4 (1960). 
27. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM 
YEARS 7 (1982). 
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who ignited a love of learning in Felix.28 Solomon Frankfurter had 
climbed the academic echelons of the universities of Vienna and 
Berlin,29 and Felix and his siblings looked up to their Uncle as an 
example of academic accomplishment, sophistication, and success­
ful cultural assimilation.30 Felix's early education in Austria's pri­
mary school system, with its emphasis on deductive reasoning and 
precision of speech, also left a mark.31 
From a young age, Felix showed an uncanny interest in politics. 
As he later recalled, "'certainly in the early teens, it became mani­
fest that I was interested in the world of affairs. . . . It began very 
early."'32 This early development of Felix's political awareness 
meant that he was not completely naive to the anti-Semitism that 
characterized Vienna's social and political upheavals of the early 
1890s. An economic recession coupled with widely publicized busi­
ness scandals involving Jewish financiers caused the city's labor and 
merchant class to rally around Kafl Lueger, a Christian Socialist 
politician who decried the power and influence of Vienna's "Jewish 
capitalists."33 "Handsome Karl," as he was called, helped draft the 
platform of the United Christians, which called for limits on Jewish 
immigration and the exclusion of Jews from many sectors of the 
economy.34 In 1894, Lueger was elected mayor of Vienna.35 Anti­
Semitism swept the city as its Jewish population became a scape­
goat for all of Austria's economic and social woes.36 Riots by uni­
28. Id. at 9. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. The struggle between ethnic heritage and assimilation is one that would 
characterize much of Frankfurter's life. This struggle came into focus during Frank­
furter's courtship of and eventual marriage to Marion Denman, a Protestant of Brah­
min background. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 11. During the courtship, Frankfurter 
worried that his mother would reject Marion because she did not share his Jewish heri­
tage. Id. at 59. He expressed his frustrations about the tenacity of these traditional 
prejudices in a letter to Marion: 
"Yes-J aspired to share life with you .... But alas! You in yourself were ... 
a symbol-the symbol of differences in "race" and "faith" and all the other 
separating institutions born of the past. The thing goes deep, down to the very 
source of life, if it goes as it goes in those elders." 
/d. at 53 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Marion Denman (June 21, 1917) (on 
file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash­
ington, D.C.». 
31. THOMAS, supra note 26, at 4. 
32. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 14 (quoting HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANK. 
FURTER REMINISCES 5 (1960». 
33. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 9. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 10. 
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versity students fueled by pan-German nationalism created an 
atmosphere of intimidation and fear for the city's Jews.J7 
In 1894, in search of better economic fortunes and a friendlier 
political climate, Felix, along with his mother and five siblings, 
sailed for the United States in steerage to join his father Leopold.38 
Not all of Vienna's Jews responded the same way to the crisis of the 
1890s.39 A majority, including Felix's Uncle Solomon, remained in 
the Hapsburg capital, hopeful that Handsome Karl's electoral suc­
cess was not a harbinger of things to come.40 
As a politically aware twelve-year-old, Felix experienced in 
Austria the fragility of freedom in the face of government aggres­
sion. He witnessed firsthand how easily societal prejudices and 
government excess could overwhelm basic notions of fair play and 
justice.41 He and his family left Austria just as Jews in Europe be­
gan to experience the hostility of a new and savage brand of anti­
Semitism, steeped in radical economics and pseudo-science.42 As a 
former Austrian with at least one enduring tie to his homeland (his 
uncle), Felix was particularly affected by news of German atrocities 
against European Jews in the 1930s.43 Frankfurter biographer Liva 
Baker explains that "[h]e could not help being mindful of the fact 
that had he lived in Europe [then], he would have lived only a box­
car ride from a concentration camp."44 In 1933, he lobbied the Sec­
retary of State to adopt a lenient policy with respect to granting 
asylum to victims of Nazi brutalities and petitioned on behalf of 
individual refugees, including his own Uncle Solomon.45 
B. From European Immigrant to Harvard Law Student 
Unfortunately, anti-Semitism was not unique to the Old World. 
Upon arriving in the United States in 1894, the Frankfurter family 
37. Id. at 9-10. 
38. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 13. 
39. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 10. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 9-10. 
42. Id. at 10. 
43. LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 200 (1969). 
44. Id. at 197. 
45. Id. at 198. In 1938, Frankfurter received a radiogram from a friend in Vienna 
saying that Nazi roughnecks had pulled his eighty-two-year-old Uncle Solomon from 
his bed and imprisoned him in a stable. Id. at 200. Frankfurter resisted the urge to call 
Roosevelt for help, fearing the appearance of political favoritism. Id. Instead, he 
worked directly through the State Department, and finally appealed to Lady Nancy 
Astor, who had good relations with the German Ambassador to London, to intervene. 
Id. at 200-01. She eventually secured Solomon's release. Id. 
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settled in New York City and ascended, with some difficulty, to the 
middle class. "Unlike many of the shtetl Jews from ... Eastern 
Europe, who ... engage[d] in radical politics" and clung stubbornly 
to Old World traditions, the Frankfurters were eager to assimilate 
into American society and assume mainstream social and economic 
values.46 As soon as they had the means, they moved into the quiet 
middle-class neighborhood of Yorkville, putting some distance be­
tween themselves and the Yiddish-speaking Jews who crowded the 
Lower East Side.47 Like many Jewish immigrant families, the 
Frankfurters believed that education held the key to success in the 
New World.48 Felix's mother, in particular, encouraged her son's 
academic inclinations.49 After graduating from City College of 
New York, Felix pursued a legal education at New York Law 
School, but eventually transferred to Harvard Law Schoo1.50 There, 
he served as an editor of the Harvard Law Review51 and graduated 
with the highest academic record since his mentor Louis Brandeis.52 
C. From Harvard Law to Public Service 
After graduating from Harvard Law School, Frankfurter ap­
plied for an associate position at the prestigious New York law firm 
of Hornblower, Byrne, Miller and Potter.53 Frankfurter's Jewish 
heritage presented, for the first time, a real obstacle to his profes­
sional goals. Hornblower had never taken on a Jewish attorney as a 
matter of unspoken policy.54 The young lawyer's outstanding aca­
demic record, however, overcame the firm's prejudices and Frank­
furter became the firm's only Jewish attorney.55 In his first week as 
an associate, he was approached by one of the partners who sug­
gested that he change his name. Frankfurter declined. 56 
Outside the safe cloister of academia, Frankfurter could not 
escape the lingering specter of anti-Semitism.57 Indeed, the reality 
of enduring prejudice against American Jews was brought home to 
46. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 11. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 12. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 16. 
51. BAKER, supra note 43, at 200. 
52. Id. at 35-55. 
53. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 22. 
54. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 22-23. 
55. Id. at 23. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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him during the difficult confirmation hearings of his mentor and 
fellow Jew, Louis Brandeis (and, to a lesser extent, during his own 
confirmation hearings).58 Brandeis's confirmation faced staunch 
opposition from the President of Harvard University, A. Lawrence 
Lowell.59 Lowell was a man who, in Frankfurter's estimation, rep­
resented the worst ethnic prejudices of the northeastern "Brahmin" 
elite (a class he both resented and envied).60 
After a brief stint at Hornblower, Frankfurter accepted the of­
fer of an apprenticeship with U.S. Attorney Henry L. Stimson.61 
Frankfurter's tutelage under Stimson had a profound impact on his 
conception of due process. His boss was, by all accounts, "'an in­
credibly effective and wholly scrupulous man.' "62 When he exe­
cuted a search, Frankfurter later recalled, "'not only wouldn't he do 
it without a search warrant, but he'd send youngsters like me ... to 
see to it that the raiding officers kept within the limits of the search 
warrant.' "63 Stimson's meticulous observance of the strictures of 
the Constitution impressed upon Frankfurter a firm belief that "the 
effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard 
of fair procedures imposed by law."64 This belief no doubt in­
formed Frankfurter's refusal to indulge the lawlessness of the Los 
Angeles County deputy sheriffs in Rochin. Even if their forcible 
extraction of the pills from Rochin's body advanced the aim of law 
enforcement, the method too closely resembled "the rack and the 
screw" to be permitted in a civilized society.65 
58. BAKER, supra note 43, at 35-55. Frankfurter was involved in the controversy 
over the appointment of Brandeis, a Jew, to the Supreme Court. In a letter to Henry L. 
Stimson, he remarked that '''the bitterness and passion round here is unbelievable.'" 
HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 48 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Henry L. Stim­
son (Mar. 18, 1916) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.». 
59. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 92. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 24-25. He quickly ascended to the level of personal assistant, doing 
research for Stimson's antitrust cases and handling several immigration cases on his 
own, In assigning these cases to him, Stimson told Frankfurter, "You are likely to have 
more understanding of their problems than some of the other lads in the office." Id. at 
25. As Frankfurter biographer H.N. Hirsch observed of the time, "the antitrust cases 
[Frankfurter1saw passing through the office began to raise Frankfurter's political con­
sciousness and to crystallize his progressivism." !d. 
62. Id. at 28 (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 48). 
63. Id. (quoting PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 48). 
64. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
65. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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D. The Sacco and Vanzetti Case 
In 1914, Frankfurter took a long hiatus from public service to 
accept a professorship at Harvard Law School. He remained there, 
with few interruptions, until his appointment to the Supreme Court 
in 1939.66 It was during this period at Harvard that a case involving 
two Italian-American immigrants, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti, caught his attention. Frankfurter's campaign to get the 
two men's death sentences and convictions for murder thrown out 
showed a special affinity for underdog causes and a heightened sen­
sitivity to due process concerns. 
By the time Frankfurter learned of the case in 1927, Sacco and 
Vanzetti had already been convicted and their lawyer, William G. 
Thompson, was making a motion for a new trial, alleging 
prosecutorial misconduct.67 His curiosity piqued, Frankfurter se­
cured a court transcript.68 Upon reading it, he concluded that vari­
ous aspects of the case violated" 'all ... notions of Anglo-American 
procedure."'69 He authored an article for the Atlantic Monthly ac­
cusing the trial judge and prosecutor of playing on the jury's anti­
immigrant sentiments.7o Quoting passages directly from the trial 
record, he also suggested that the prosecutor had colluded with the 
government's ballistics expert to mislead the court and that the 
court interpreter had intentionally mistranslated the defendants' 
testimony to weaken their case.71 
Harvard President, A. Lawrence Lowell (who, as already men­
tioned, had opposed Louis Brandeis's confirmation to the Supreme 
Court two decades earlier), was appointed by Governor Fuller of 
Massachusetts to head a committee considering clemency for the 
two convicts.72 Under his leadership, the committee found that the 
trial had been just, "on the whole," and that clemency was not war­
ranted.73 President Lowell's involvement in the case on the side of 
66. BAKER, supra note 43, at 206-07. 
67. Id. at 119. 
68. Id. 
69. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 93 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Walter 
Lippmann (July 13, 1927) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Divi­
sion, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.». 
70. Id. 
71. Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 
1927, available at http://www.theatlantic.comJunboundlflashbks/oj/frankff.htm. 
72. N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A Prequel 
to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1323 
(1989). 
73. [d. 
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the government personalized the controversy for Frankfurter.74 He 
saw it as a contest between the forces of prejudice, for which Lowell 
was a perfect representative, and the forces of reason, championed 
by men like himself for whom race and creed were mere accidents 
of birth.75 
This controversy over the fates of the two Italian-American im­
migrants touched a nerve with Frankfurter.76 In correspondence 
with his Harvard colleagues, he confessed that his mind was 
"'wholly absorbed by the Sacco-Vanzetti case."'77 Frankfurter's in­
volvement in the case was pivotal for him because it weaved to­
gether two distinct threads in his life: his evolving conception of due 
process, so heavily influenced by Stimson's example, and his ongo­
ing experience as an immigrant and an American JewJ8 His early 
life experiences gave him a unique appreciation for the importance 
of fair process to the survival of liberty. In this case, it was clear to 
Frankfurter that, by exploiting the defendants' "alien blood, their 
imperfect knowledge of English, [and] their unpopular social 
views," the district attorney had, with the connivance of the trial 
judge, "invoked against [the defendants] a riot of political passion 
and patriotic sentiment[ ],"79 thereby violating their "'elementary 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial."'80 A quarter of a 
century later, Frankfurter would reiterate this belief that due pro­
cess contained an inherent right to a fair and impartial trial in 
Stroble v. California.81 
E. U.S. Supreme Court Justice and Due Process Advocate 
Frankfurter's appreciation of the importance of due process as 
an indispensable pillar of freedom was apparent throughout his ju­
risprudence. In Rochin, he stated unequivocally that the guarantee 
of due process extends even to "'those charged with the most hei­
74. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 92. 
75. Id. at 93. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 92 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Roscoe Pound, Dean, 
Harvard Law School (Aug. 22, 1927) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manu­
script Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
78. Id. at 91-94. 
79. Frankfurter, supra note 71. 
80. Id. (quoting the oral argument of Sacco and Vanzetti's attorney, William G. 
Thompson). 
81. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 
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nous offenses."'82 In the wiretapping case of On Lee v. United 
States, Frankfurter's dissenting opinion echoed Justice Holmes's 
sentiment that the clean administration of justice trumps (and, in 
many cases, serves) the "war against crime."83 In Irvine v. Califor­
nia, another wiretapping case, Frankfurter's dissenting opinion 
again asserted the primacy of due process over law enforcement 
goals. He conceded that: 
Of course it is a loss to the community when a conviction is over­
turned because the indefensible means by which it was obtained 
... [violate] the commands of due process .... But the people 
can avoid such miscarriages of justice. A sturdy, self-respecting 
democratic community should not put up with lawless police and 
prosecutors.84 
To be clear, Frankfurter did not, in every case, side with the 
criminal. Indeed, his expansive "fundamental rights" approach to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was cabined 
by an abiding judicial restraint and humility that often compelled 
him to respect state judgments concerning the appropriate develop­
ment and enforcement of state law.85 But even in those cases 
where he declined to extend the "fundamental rights" notion, he 
did so with a full and, in some instances, burdensome appreciation 
of the attendant sacrifice of liberty. In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, the Court struck down a school board regu­
lation compelling daily flag salutes, a practice that offended the re­
ligious beliefs of several Jehovah's Witness students.86 The 
intensely personal, almost apologetic tone of Frankfurter's dissent­
ing opinion suggests that his decision to side with the school board 
did not come easy: 
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in 
history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed 
by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I 
should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general liberta­
82. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 
324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961)). 
83. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
U '[A] less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play 
an ignoble part.'" !d. at 760 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
84. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
85. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp, 
367 U.S. 643. 
86. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
400 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:389 
rian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the 
thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither 
Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal 
attachment to the Constitution and are equally bound by our ju­
dicial obligations whether we derive our citizenship from the ear­
liest or the latest immigrants to these shoresP 
As Frankfurter expressed in a letter to Justice Stanley Reed, Bar­
nette involved the weightiest questions of "'the realm which . . . 
touches the liberties of our people.' "88 No doubt, his familiarity 
with the tribulations suffered by Jews in Europe and the United 
States heightened his sensitivity to hardships faced by other relig­
ious minorities. Ultimately, however, he concluded that the actions 
of the school board did not so "shock[ ] the conscience"89 as to im­
plicate the Due Process Clause. Frankfurter conceded that West 
Virginia's statute making flag salutes a mandatory part of daily 
classroom routine may have presented a valid argument for legisla­
tive reform.90 In his view, however, the Court lacked the authority 
to rewrite statutes to fit its private notions of justice.91 
Opinions like Barnette defy efforts to explain Frankfurter's due 
process jurisprudence solely in terms of his life experience. During 
his twenty-three years on the bench, Frankfurter attempted to di­
vorce his judicial decision making from any personal views or biases 
that might have flowed from his experience as a young professional, 
immigrant, or Jew. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, for example, he 
set aside his personal sympathies as an immigrant to uphold the 
deportation of several resident aliens on the grounds of their for­
mer membership in the communist party.92 Frankfurter defended 
his decision as an exercise of judicial restraint, respecting Con­
87. Id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
88. BAKER, supra note 43, at 269 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stan­
ley F. Reed, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 9, 1943) (on 
file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash­
ington, D.C.» (alteration in original). 
89. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
90. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 651-52 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
91. [d. at 647-71. Over the years, Frankfurter made many friends among ranks of 
progressives and libertarian activists. In 1920, he helped found the American Civil Lib­
erties Union (ACLU), which submitted amicus briefs in several of the cases discussed in 
this Article. His liberal allies were sorely disappointed, however, by his Barnette dis­
sent. Roger Nash Baldwin of the ACLU said, "I recollect no decision of our former 
colleague Felix Frankfurter which dismayed us more than his labored defense of com­
pulsory flag saluting." BAKER, supra note 43, at 270. 
92. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597-98 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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gress's prerogative to proffer immigration policies.93 Such policies, 
he explained, fall within the exclusive province of the legislature. It 
makes no difference whether the policies "have been crude and 
cruel" in the past, or "have reflected xenophobia in general or anti­
Semitism or anti-Catholicism."94 In Korematsu v. United States, 
Frankfurter again down played his identity as a member of a perse­
cuted minority, voting to uphold the forced relocation and intern­
ment of Japanese Americans during World War 11.95 Although his 
concurrence in that case had little to do with the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it provides a poignant illus­
tration of his (sometimes regrettable) ability to set aside personal 
sympathies.96 
Frankfurter at once acknowledged personal biases and insisted 
on their irrelevance to his judicial decision making. In Haley v. 
Ohio, for example, he stated that, although he personally opposed 
capital punishment and the SUbjection of minors to conventional 
criminal procedures, he would not base constitutional rules of due 
process on such privately held beliefs.97 After voting in Francis v. 
Resweber to uphold the death sentence of Willie Francis, a young 
African American male,98 he wrote an anguished letter to Justice 
Harold Burton, who had dissented. In this letter, Frankfurter ex­
plained his personal opposition to the death penalty and the rea­
sons for his vote: 
I have to hold on to myself not to reach your result. I am pre­
vented from doing so only by the disciplined thinking of a life­
time regarding the duty of this Court. . . . Holmes used to 
express it by saying he would not strike down state action unless 
93. Id. at 596-97. 
94. Id. at 597. 
95. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
96. One could argue that Barnette, Korematsu, and Harisiades simply reflect 
Frankfurter's capitulation to yet another deep-seated bias: patriotism. Biographer Liva 
Baker wrote of Frankfurter: "[He] possessed an almost childlike patriotism. He could 
be aggressive about it, even arrogant, sometimes self-righteous. It was the patriotism of 
a man who had first seen America in the person of the Statue of Liberty at the impres­
sionable age of twelve ...." BAKER, supra note 43, at 236. 
97. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601-07 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A 
cynic might note that he nonetheless voted with the majority in this case, overturning 
the conviction of a fifteen-year-old boy for first-degree murder based on the minor's 
coerced confession. Despite all his invocations of objectivity and judicial restraint, 
Frankfurter's resolution of the case nevertheless coincided with his personal views of 
criminal justice. 
98. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470-72 (1947). 
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the action of the state made him "puke." ... And that being so, I 
cannot say it so shocks the accepted, prevailing standards of fair­
ness not to allow the state to electrocute ....99 
In deciding discreet issues of due process, Frankfurter was quite ca­
pable of stripping away his personal biases and placing his judicial 
"duty" above his identity as a libertarian, immigrant, and Jew. That 
said, a study of Frankfurter's childhood and early career neverthe­
less provides useful insights into the development of his due process 
jurisprudence. Frankfurter himself acknowledged that" 'every man 
who writes, in large measure writes his autobiography.' "100 Here, 
Frankfurter's "autobiography" can be found, not in his disposition 
of individual cases-he often approached individual cases with a 
conscious disregard for his own personal views-but in his overall 
fundamental rights approach. 
This section has explored one aspect of that approach: Frank­
furter,s unwavering view that due process constitutes the very "es­
sence of justice."lOl Even if on discreet questions, he was capable 
of detaching himself from personal biases, his underlying apprecia­
tion for the importance of due process in a free society was none­
theless inextricably rooted in experience. In his twenty-three years 
on the bench, Frankfurter devoted considerable time and energy to 
the development of Fourteenth Amendment due process jurispru­
dence. Of the cases that came before the Court bearing on the sub­
ject, he wrote opinions for more than a third. Among his 
contemporaries, he was one of the most prolific authors of such 
opinions, second only to Justices Harlan and Stevens.1°2 The zeal 
with which he pursued the "incorporation" debate suggests that, for 
Frankfurter, the issue of fair process carried special significance. 
His experience as a Jew and as an immigrant heightened his sensi­
tivity to abuses of individual liberty and made the issue of due pro­
cess a centerpiece of his constitutional jurisprudence. His exposure 
to Henry Stimson as a young professional impressed upon him the 
99. UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 154-55 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Harold Burton, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court (Dec. 13, 1946) (on file 
with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washing­
ton, D.C.), in MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, 
HUGO BLACK AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 160 (1984)). 
100. THOMAS, supra note 26, at xi (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Bran­
deis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 181,181 (1941)). 
101. See HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 57. 
102. See infra app. A. See appendix B for a complete chart showing figures for 
every Justice, since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, who wrote opinions 
on the Due Process Clause. 
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belief that effective law enforcement and the scrupulous observance 
of constitutional rights were compatible, indeed complimentary, 
goals. Frankfurter's transcendence of personal biases and personal 
identity in deciding discrete controversies does not negate the influ­
ence of these experiences on his most fundamental assumptions 
about the nature of liberty. Indeed, as the next section explains, 
even his insistence on dispassionate, objective judicial inquiry has 
roots in his experience. 
II. REASON AND EMPIRICISM: THE 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 

Justice Frankfurter's due process jurisprudence places a great 
deal of emphasis on reason and empiricism, values that have roots 
in his early development as a legal scholar and young professional. 
According to Frankfurter's fundamental rights doctrine, the stric­
tures of the Due Process Clause must be understood in light of con­
temporary societal norms, which can only be ascertained by a 
reasoned and empirical study of existing law and practices across 
jurisdictions. In Rochin, Frankfurter began his elucidation of the 
fundamental rights approach with a quote from his predecessor on 
the bench, Justice Cardozo. He defined due process as "[a] summa­
rized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immuni­
ties which ... are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental' or are 'implicit in the con­
cept of ordered liberty."'lo3 
Frankfurter went on to explain that the various guarantees of 
the Constitution have, through "the deposit of history," acquired 
varying degrees of rigidity and technicality.104 Some provisions, 
such as the jury requirement of the Sixth and Seventh Amend­
ments, have taken on specific, technical meanings. lOS Provisions 
that deal with basic human rights, however, lack such precision, re­
quiring a continuing process of application and development.106 
103. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu­
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1 (1964»; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. -319,325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Mary­
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
104. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169. 
105. Id. at 169-70. 
106. Id. 
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment falls in this 
latter category.107 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a mentor and idol of Jus­
tice Frankfurter,108 famously said in his first of eleven lectures on 
the common law that "[the] felt necessities of the time, the preva­
lent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy" and 
"even the prejudices [of] judges," playa greater role in shaping the 
law than immutable principles of natural law and syllogistic reason­
ing.109 Echoing this sentiment, Frankfurter acknowledged in 
Rochin that the meaning (or the "gloss") of due process and other 
fundamental rights evolves with time.110 He stated that, "When the 
gloss has thus not been fixed [by the deposit of history] but is a 
function of the process of judgment, the judgment is bound to fall 
differently at different times and differently at the same time 
through different judges."111 Frankfurter's views on the transience 
of the law took shape long before he ever sat on the bench. In 
1912, he said that, "'if facts are changing, law cannot be static. So­
called immutable principles must accommodate themselves to facts 
of life . . . .' "112 
How then should judges ascertain whether due process has 
been accorded in any given instance? According to Frankfurter, 
the Fourteenth Amendment casts upon the Court the responsibility 
to judge "the whole course of proceedings" in order to determine 
"whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."1l3 This 
judgment, he explained, "requires an evaluation based on a disin­
terested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order 
of facts exactly and fairly stated."114 Through adherence to rea­
soned and empirical study of historical precedent and contempo­
rary societal norms, judges can avoid discretionary and judicial 
107. Id. at-170. 
108. Lawrence S. Wrightsman & Justin R. La Mort, Why Do Supreme Court Jus­
tices Succeed or Fail? Harry Blackmun as an Example, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1261, 1267 
(2005). 
109. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1,35 (1881), available 
at http://biotech.law.lsu.edulBooks!Holmes/claw03.htm (last visited May 7, 2007). 
110. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-70. 
111. Id. at 170. 
112. THOMAS, supra note 26, at 172 (1960) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The 
Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the Harvard Law Review Twenty-fifth Anniver­
sary Dinner (Mar. 30, 1912)). 
113. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169. 
114. Id. at 172. 
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caprice, while "reconciling the needs both of continuity and of 
change in a progressive society."115 
Applying this approach in Rochin, Frankfurter observed that 
recent case law rejected the proposition that "due process of law is 
heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evi­
dence is obtained."1l6 In particular, he referenced "the series of 
recent cases [that] enforced the constitutional principle that the 
States may not base convictions upon confessions, however much 
verified, obtained by coercion."117 Coerced confessions, he ex­
plained, violate not only the Fifth Amendment's proscription 
against self-incrimination, but also the Due Process Clause because 
they "offend the community's sense of fair play and decency."118 
Similarly, the admission of "real" evidence forcibly extracted from 
a suspect's body to obtain a conviction violates due process. As 
Frankfurter put it: "It would be a stultification of the responsibility 
which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court 
to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by 
force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach."119 
As empirical evidence of society's disapprobation of such 
methods, Frankfurter noted that all California judges who ex­
pressed themselves in the Rochin case have condemned the con­
duct of the three Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs in the 
strongest possible terms.120 The means by which Rochin's convic­
tion was obtained did "more than offend some fastidious squea­
mishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too 
energetically."121 The forcible extraction of the capsules from 
Rochin's stomach and their subsequent admission into evidence "is 
conduct that shocks the conscience,"122 or as Holmes might have 
put it, "makes [one] puke. "123 
Frankfurter reiterated this "scientific" approach to due process 
two years later in Irvine v. California, when he dissented from the 
115. [d. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 172-73. 
118. [d. at 173. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 174. 
121. [d. at 172. 
122. [d. 
123. UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 154-55 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Harold Burton, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 13, 1946) 
(on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.». 
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majority's affirmation of a conviction based on evidenced obtained 
through illegal home wiretapping.124 In his dissent, he echoed 
much of his Rochin opinion, observing that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment is not a "mechanical yardstick" and that judicial deliberations 
over due process should include an "empiric[ all process" and a 
case-by-case "judgment upon variant situations by the wisdom of 
experience."125 In this way, the content of the due process guaran­
tee evolves and is slowly revealed through the disposition of cases 
over time.126 
Frankfurter's approach stands in stark contrast to the certainty 
and finality of Justice Black's "total incorporation" view, which 
reads most of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.127 Black wrote in a dissenting opinion in 1947 
that he arrived at this view through a study of "the historical events 
that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment," including the "ex­
pressions of those who sponsored and favored, as well as those who 
opposed its submission and passage. "128 This historical examina­
tion persuaded him that, "one of the chief objects that [the Due 
Process Clause was] intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of 
Rights applicable to the States,"129 thereby overruling the 1833 pre­
cedent of Barron v. Baltimore, which held that the Bill of Rights, by 
its own terms, applied only to the federal government.130 
Frankfurter's reading of the Due Process Clause was not so 
restrained by "original intent" as Black's, and his approach did not 
provide an easy bright-line rule to guide courts. In Wolf v. Colo­
rado, he noted that although "a tidy formula for the easy determi­
nation of what is a fundamental right ... may satisfy a longing for 
certainty," it ignores the movements and progress of a free soci­
ety.l3l Frankfurter may have learned this distaste for formula from 
124. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. at 147. Again, Frankfurter seems to be channeling his mentor, Justice 
Holmes, who famously said, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi­
ence." HOLMES, supra note 109, at 1. 
126. JACOBS, supra note 17, at 207. 
127. Id. at 206-07. 
128. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), over­
ruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
129. Id. at 71-72. 
130. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
131. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). 
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his mentor, Justice Holmes, who once observed that '''[t]o rest 
upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.' "132 
A rigorous dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom provides 
perhaps the best illustration of Frankfurter's empirical approach to 
due process questions.133 Justice Black, writing for the Court, up­
held a Georgia statute allowing the governor to unilaterally deter­
mine the sanity of persons to be executed, without a hearing or 
judicial review.134 Frankfurter began his dissenting analysis by 
plumbing the common law, and concluded that a prohibition 
against executions of the insane "carries ... impressive credentials 
of history."135 An empirical analysis of society's contemporary atti­
tudes towards such executions lent further support to this prohibi­
tion.136 He detailed his factual findings in an extensive appendix 
showing that "not a single State ... [had] uprooted the heritage of 
the common law which deemed it too barbarous to execute a man 
while insane."137 
A. Origins in Academia 
As already mentioned, Frankfurter's view of the Due Process 
Clause began to take shape well before he joined the Supreme 
Court bench in 1939. Seven years before his confirmation, he wrote 
a letter to the New York Times congratulating the Supreme Court 
for its recent decision in the Scottsboro case.u8 The letter evi­
denced an already completely formed "fundamental rights" theory: 
"The more heinous the charge," Frankfurter declared, "the more 
important the safeguards which the experience of centuries has 
shown to be essential to the ascertainment of even fallible truth . 
. . . The Supreme Court [in the Scottsboro case] has declared 
only that the determination [of guilt or innocence] must be made 
with due observance of the decencies of civilized procedure."139 
132. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quot­
ing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECfED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1920». 
133. Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 14-26 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 
abrogated by Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
134. Id. at 14 (majority opinion). 
135. Id. at 17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
136. See JACOBS, supra note 17, at 201-03. 
137. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 22. 
138. BAKER, supra note 43, at 266. See generally Powell v. Alabama (Scottsboro), 
287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
139. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, A Notable Decision, The Supreme 
Court Writes a Chapter on Man's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1939, at E1). 
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Frankfurter's reliance on reason and empiricism to ascertain 
society's ever-changing standards of decency has its origins in his 
early intellectual development. From a young age, Felix showed a 
strong predisposition towards intellectual pursuits. As a toddler in 
Austria, he idolized his Uncle Solomon, who had achieved some 
distinction as a scholar and librarian at the University of Vienna.140 
When the Frankfurters moved to the New World, they encouraged 
Felix's academic proclivities. For immigrant Jews, an education car­
ried with it the promise of upward mobility and the possibility of 
acceptance by mainstream society.141 Felix's mother often 
preached about the necessity of academic achievement in 
America's cutthroat society.142 Frankfurter took it to heartY3 
An appreciation for the value of education was a central part 
of Frankfurter's judicial philosophy. Through scientific study of so­
ciety, he believed that human nature could evolve and change for 
the better. "'The fundamental assumption of civilization,'" he 
wrote, "'is the conscious ability to modify and enlarge human na­
ture."'144 This tremendous faith in the power of education to 
change and uplift societal norms explains Frankfurter's aversion to 
Justice Black's rigid formulation of "due process" as encompassing 
only the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments of the Bill 
of Rights. Frankfurter believed that due process is "not a stagnant 
formulation of what has been achieved in the past but [rather] a 
standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institu­
tions of a free society."145 
B. Brandeis's Influence: Empiricism 
One of Frankfurter's primary influences, Justice Brandeis, had 
all but invented the use of empiricism in law. In 1908, Brandeis 
represented Oregon in the Supreme Court case of Muller v. Ore­
gon.146 The case involved the challenge of an Oregon statute limit­
ing a woman's work day to ten hours.147 In defending the statute, 
Brandeis submitted a legal brief containing extensive data collected 
140. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 13; PARRISH, supra note 27, at 9, 12. 
141. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 12. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. 
144. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 41 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Henry L. Stimson (May 19, 1913) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
145. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945). 
146. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
147. [d. at 416. 
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from mUltiple sources.148 In what became known as the "Brandeis 
Brief," he presented sociological information on the impact of long 
work days on women,149 The Court held for Oregon, and the Bran­
deis Brief became the standard for future Supreme Court 
presentations.15o 
In 1909, Brandeis gave a lecture at the Harvard Ethical Soci­
ety, entitled "The Opportunity in the Law."15I Frankfurter at­
tended the lecture and immediately took a liking to the seasoned 
Supreme Court litigator, who shared both Frankfurter's cultural 
heritage and politicalleanings.152 By 1910, the two had begun cor­
responding regularly,153 When Frankfurter moved to Washington 
several years later, he became Brandeis's protege and confidant,1s4 
Brandeis's influence can be seen throughout his protege's due 
process jurisprudence. Frankfurter's reliance on reason and empiri­
cism to adduce societal norms recalls the logic of the "Brandeis 
Brief," looking beyond the syllogism for guidance in deciding cases. 
Frankfurter adopted the "paradigm of the scientific expert."155 In a 
concurring opinion to Haley v. Ohio, for example, Frankfurter in­
voked "expert" knowledge in attempting to ascertain the "perva­
sive feeling of our society"156 on whether a confession obtained 
from a minor was, in this case, the product of a deliberate and re­
sponsible choice.157 
C. Bisbee and Mooney Affairs: Disinterested Reason 
Beyond raw empiricism, Frankfurter's due process opmlOns 
are rife with appeals to disinterested reason. In Rochin, for exam­
ple, Frankfurter stated that" 'due process of law' requires [in each 
case] an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry"158 and that 
these considerations are "deeply rooted in reason."159 Frank­
148. Id. at 419. 
149. David W. Levy, Brandeis, the Reformer, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 711,716 (2007). 
150. Louis Brandeis, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/ 
eb/article-9016209/Louis-Brandeis (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
151. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 32. 
152. Id. at 31-32. 
153. Id. at 32. 
154. Id. at 33-34. 
155. UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 149. 
156. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abro­
gated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
157. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
158. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (emphasis added), overruled 
on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
159. /d. at 171 (emphasis added). 
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furter's involvement in the Bisbee and Mooney labor disputes, 
more than two decades eariier,160 helped shape this view. He 
emerged from these controversies with a clear conception of justice 
as the triumph of reason and neutrality over passion and 
prejudice.161 
In the Bisbee controversy, the residents of a mining town had, 
through an act of vigilantism, expelled a group of striking mine 
workers.162 On July 12, 1917, the town's sheriff and a large armed 
force sequestered the strikers and, without court authorization, de­
ported them to the desert for two days without food. 163 When the 
War Department learned of the deportation, it relocated the strik­
ers to a neighboring town until the dispute could be resolved.164 
Serving on President Wilson's Mediation Commission, Frankfurter 
was dispatched to Bisbee to conduct an investigation into the inci­
dent.165 There, he prepared a detailed report, identifying what he 
believed to be the primary source of tension: the lack of "democ­
racy in labor relations."166 Armed with this report, the commission 
created a disinterested body to hear labor grievances so that dis­
putes could be resolved without recourse to strike or lockout.167 
Frankfurter later observed of the commission's approach that" '[i]t 
did not put anybody in jail. . . . It did not take any vengeance on 
the perpetrators' "168 but, by setting forth a reasoned, fair-minded 
examination of the incident, was able to instill in the vigilantes a 
"sense of shame. "169 The report was helpful, therefore, "in 'stirring 
up a different state of mind and generating different feelings'" in 
Bisbeepo The Bisbee affair reinforced Frankfurter's faith in the 
power of disinterested, reasoned exposition to change minds and 
produce wise outcomes. 
In the Mooney controversy, a labor agitator had been sen­
tenced to death for setting off a bomb in San Francisco, killing 
160. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 55-56. 
161. Id. at 57-58. 
162. BAKER, supra note 43, at 66. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 67. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 68 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Lawrence Hackett (Jan. 6, 
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nineteen people in the summer of 1916.171 Frankfurter, on behalf 
of the President's Mediation Commission, prepared a report alleg­
ing that the conviction had been obtained "on the basis of perjured 
testimony."l72 President Wilson urged California's governor to 
grant a new trial, but the governor would only commute the sen­
tence to life imprisonment.173 
Because of his public defense of the labor agitator, Frankfurter 
earned a reputation for radicalismP4 Former President Theodore 
Roosevelt, who saw eye-to-eye with Frankfurter on few issues, de­
nounced what he called the jurist'S "Bolshevik influences."175 In a 
letter published in the Boston Herald, Roosevelt accused Frank­
furter of "'taking, on behalf of the Administration an attitude 
which seems to be fundamentally that of Trotsky and the other Bol­
sheviki leaders in Russia.' "176 The wording of Frankfurter's re­
sponse to Roosevelt, again, reveals his strong attachment to the 
notion of "disinterested" and "reasoned" judgment: "'I think if 
you knew all the facts, I think if you inquired of those who see 
fairly, and without blind passion, in San Francisco you would find 
that I pursued the inquiry in a thorough-going, judicial, and if I may 
say so, sensible way ... .' "177 
Frankfurter's emphasis on empiricism and detached reason in 
his due process jurisprudence stems from a rigorous academic tradi­
tion reaching back to his boyhood days in Austria.178 His mother's 
encouragement nurtured a love of academia and a belief in the 
power of education to elevate the human condition.179 The influ­
ence of his friend and mentor Justice Brandeis reinforced Frank­
furter's scientific approach to the law, particularly regarding 
questions of due process. His involvement in the Bisbee and 
Mooney controversies brought home to him the importance of dis­
interested and reasoned inquiries, especially since "standards of jus­
171. Id. at 69. 
172. HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 56. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. at 56-57. 
175. [d. at 56. 
176. [d. at 57 (quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Felix Frankfurter 
(Dec. 19, 1917)). 
177. Id. (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Theodore Roosevelt (Jan. 7, 
1918) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Con­
gress, Washington, D.C.)). 
178. THOMAS, supra 26, at 4. 
179. PARRISH, supra note 27, at 11-12. 
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tice are not authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they 
were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia."180 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]he life of the law has not been 
logic: it has been experience."181 Frankfurter's experience as a 
young professional, immigrant, and Jew played as much a part in 
shaping his approach to due process as did logic or syllogism. His 
early exposure to anti-Semitism in Austria gave him a keen appreci­
ation for the importance of fair play in a free society. This appreci­
ation was reinforced by his life as an American Jew. Under Henry 
L. Stimson's tutelage, he discovered that due process and effective 
law enforcement were not necessarily mutually exclusive goals. His 
tireless work on the Sacco and Vanzetti case demonstrated that, for 
him, due process was not merely an academic question; it was a 
matter of vital importance about which he held deeply personal 
beliefs. 
These personal beliefs were not themselves the source of 
Frankfurter's due process jurisprudence. Rather, he searched for 
truth outside of himself, through empirical analysis and "scientific" 
inquiry. Even this aspect of his judicial philosophy, however, was 
rooted in experience. His approach to ascertaining the norms and 
social values that define due process using objective, "scientific" 
means represents the culmination of Frankfurter's academic pur­
suits and the influence of his friend and mentor Louis Brandeis. 
That Frankfurter's "fundamental rights" approach to the Due Pro­
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was more a product of 
his psychology and his experience, than it was a formula of logic, 
can be seen in its many contradictions and paradoxes.182 It is at 
once restrictive, in that it does not automatically incorporate the 
entire Bill of Rights, and expansive, in that it recognizes the possi­
ble existence of unenumerated rights (such as the right to pri­
vacy).183 It at once gives judges license to enact social consensus 
and fashion new rights out of whole cloth, and exhorts judges to 
show humility and restraint in the exercise of that power.184 Frank­
furter was never one to insist upon rigid consistency in any event. It 
180. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,417 (1945). 
181. HOLMES, supra note 109, at 1. 
182. See UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 148-49. 
183. See JACOBS, supra note 17, at 199. 
184. See id. 
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seemed to him that Justice Black's blanket rule of "total incorpora­
tion," was an attempt to freeze" 'due process of law' at some fixed 
stage of time and thought."185 The changing values of society and 
progress of the human race would be lost on such a formulation. 
Constitutional adjudication, Frankfurter wrote in Rochin, is not "a 
function for inanimate machines," but for judges.l86 
185. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
186. Id. 
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ApPENDIX A 

TEN MOST PROLIFIC WRITERS OF SUPREME COURT 





Due Due Which Due 
Period of Process Process Opinions Process 
Service Years of Cases Opinions Were Dissents 
Justice (AJ/CJ) Service Heard Authored Authored Authored 
Harlan II 1955-1971 16 245 112 46% 57 
Stevens 1975­ - 284 117 41% 57 
Frankfurter 1939-1962 23 278 100 36% 30 
Douglas 1939-1975 36 497 175 35% 87 
1972-1986 I 
Rehnquist 1986-2005 33 338 113 33% 45 
Brennan 1956-1990 33 549 174 32% 78 
Black 1937-1971 34 440 138 31% 59 
Stewart 1958-1981 23 418 128 31% 33 
T. Marshall 1967-1991 24 370 102 28% 66 
B. White 1962-1993 31 467 120 26% 41 
187. Note that Justice Frankfurter's lead of Justices Douglas and Rehnquist for 
the "Percentage of Due Process Cases in which Opinions Were Authored" may fall 
within the margin of error of the survey. 
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ApPENDIX B 

NUMBER OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS 























Samuel Nelson, N.Y. 1845·1872 27 0 Edward T. Sanford, Tenn. 1923-1930 7 14 
Raben C. Grier, Pa. 







Harlan F. Stone, N.Y. 1925-1941 
(1941-1946) 21 65 
Noah H. Swayne, Ohio 1862·1881 18 I 
Owen J. Roberts, Pa. 1930-1945 15 31 
Samuel F. Miller, Iowa 1862·1890 28 7 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, N. Y. 1932·1938 6 20 
David Davis, ill. 1862·18n 14 0 Hugo L Black, AJa. 1937·1971 34 138 
Stephen J. Field, Cal. 1863·1897 34 18 Stanley F. Reed, Ky. 1938-1957 19 39 
Salmon P. Cha>e, Ohio 1864-1873 8 0 FeIlx FranIdin1er, Mass. 1'139·1962 23 100 
William Soong, Pa. 187()'1880 10 4 William O. Douglas, Conn. 1939-1975 36 175 
Joseph P. Brndley, NJ. 187()'1892 21 9 Frank Murphy, Mich. I94(). 1949 9 20 
Ward Hun~ N.Y. 1872-1882 9 0 James F. Bymes, S.c. 1941·1942 I 2 
Monison R. Waite, Ohio 1874·1888 14 7 Roben H. Jackson, Pa. 1941·1954 13 37 
John M. Harlan, Ky. 1877-1911 33 51 Wiley B. Rutledge, Iowa 1943·1949 6 17 
William B. Woods, Ga. 188().1887 6 I Harold H. Bunon, Ohio 1945·1958 13 15 
Stanley Manhews, Ohio 1881·1889 7 4 Frederick M. Vinson, Ky. 1946-1953 7 12 
Horace Gray, Mass. 1882·1902 20 II Tom C. CIarl<, Tex. 1949-1967 17 56 
Samuel Blatchford, N.Y. 1882·1893 II I Shennan Minton, Ind. 1949·1956 7 9 
Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Miss. 1888-1893 5 12 Earl Warren, Cal. (1953-1969) 15 40 
Melville W. Fuller, lD. 1888·1910 21 31 
John M. Harlan, N.Y. 1955·1971 16 112 
David J. Brewer, Kan. 1889-1910 20 26 William J. Brennan, Jr., NJ. 1956-1990 33 174 
Henry B. Brown. Mich. 1890-1906 15 16 Charles E. Whinaker, Mo. 1957·1962 5 7 
George Shims, Jr., Pa. 1892·1903 10 II Potter Stewart, Ohio 1958·1981 23 128 
Howell E. Jackson, Tenn. 1893-1895 2 0 Byron R. White, Colo. 1962·1993 31 120 
Edward D. White, La. 1894-1910 
(191()'1921) 26 52 
AMur J. Goidberg,lll. 







Rufus W. Peckham, N. Y. 1895-1909 13 21 Thurgood Man;hail, N.Y. 1967·1991 24 102 
Joseph McKenna, Cal. 1898-1925 26 n Warren E. Burger, Va (1969·1986) 17 61 
OliverW. Holmes,Mass. 1902·1932 29 95 Hany A. Blackmun, Minn. 197()'1994 24 98 
William R. Day, Ohio 1903·1922 19 53 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Va. 1972-1987 15 24 
William H. Moody, Mass. 







William H. Rehnqui,~ Ariz. 
1972-1986 
(1986-2005) 33 113 
0Iarl", E. Hughes. N.Y. 191()'1916 
(1930-1941) 16 
44 
John Paul Stevens, lli. 







Willis Van Devanter, Wyo. 191()'1937 26 38 Antonin Scalia. Va. 1986­ - 28 
Joseph R. Lamar, Ga 191()'1916 4 12 Anthony M. Kennedy, Cal. 1988­ - 19 
Mahlon Pitney, NJ. 1912·1922 10 46 David H. Souter, N.H. 199(). - 19 
James C. McReynolds, Tenn. 1914-1941 26 54 Clarence Thomas, Ga 1991· - 13 
Loais D. Brandeis, Mass. 1916-1939 22 50 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N. Y. 1993­ - 12 
John H. Clarlre, Ohio 1916-1922 5 9 Stephen G. Breyer, Mass. 1994­ - II 
William H. Taft, Conn. 1921·1930 8 24 John G. Raben" Md. 2005­ - 0 
George Sutherland, Utah 1922·1938 15 34 Samuel A. Alito, Jr., NJ. 2006­ - 0 
Pierce Butler, Minn. 1923·1939 16 57 
188. In May 2007, the figures on this chart were calculated by entering the 
following search command on LexisNexis for each Justice in the database "U,S, 
Supreme Court Cases, Lawyer's Edition": "date aft 1867 and WRITTENBY ('Justice's 
Name') and CORE-TERMS (Fourteenth Amendment) and Due Process." Justice 
Powell's opinions on due process were calculated by entering the following search 
command on LexisNexis: WRITTENBY (Powell) and "due process" 110 "fourteenth 
amendment" and CORE-TERMS (process). 
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ApPENDIX C 
TIMELINE OF REFERENCED EVENTS IN 
FRANKFURTER'S LIFE 
1885 	 1890 1895 
1882: Born in 	 1894: Irrunigrated III 
Vienna Austria. 	 the age of twelve to 
the United States 
with his family. 
1920 1925 1930 
1916: Louis 1927: Publicly 1932: Wrote letterto 
Brandeis confirmed defended Sacco and New York Times 
to Supmne Court. Vanzeni. congratulating !he 
Supreme Coun for 
recent decision in 
Scottsboro case. 
1917: Compiled 1933: Lobbied the 
repons on Bisbee Secretary of Slate to 
and Mooney Affairs adopt lenient llSyJum 
as mcmberof policy for victims of 
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1900 1905 1910 1915 
1902: Enrolled III 1905: Grnd~ted 1909: Aueodcd 1913: Addressed the 
Hmvard Law from HlU'Vlll'rl Law Brandeis Iectun: 0tI Harvard Law 
School. School and joir:ed -rhe OpponunilY in Review on '1be 
Hornblower, Byrne. the Low'" d the Zeitgeist and the 
Miller and Ponet. HllI"Vnrd Ethical Judicwy," 
Society. 
1906: Accepted 1911: Moved to 1914: Accepted 
apprenticeship with D.C. ",im Stimson III profeuonhip at 
U. S. Attorney, Harvanll.aw-..W" 
Henry L Stimson. Department post. School. 
Devdopc:d close ties 
with Brnndeis and 
1935 
1938: Worked 
throogh the State 
Department and 
Lady Nancy Astor to 
secure a release of 
Uncle Solomon from 
Nazi iOC"llIl;enl.tioD. 
1939: Confirmed to 
the Supreme Coon. 
Holmes. 
Supreme Court Justice (1939-1962) 




McNabb v. Uniled States. 
318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
West Virginia v. Bamelle. 
319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
Korem:llsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944), 
Malinski v. New York. 324 
U.S. 404 (1945), 

Adamson v. California, 332 

U.5. 46 (1947), 
Slate of Louisiana tX rtf 
Francis v. Reswcber. 329 
U.S. 459 (1947). 












Solesbee v. Balkom. 339 U.S. 

9(19~O). 
Harisiacles v. Stlaughnessy. 
342 U.S. ~80( 1952). 
On Lee v. United Stales. 343 
U.S. 747 (1952). 

Rochin v. California, 342 

U.s. 165 (1952). 

Stroble v. California, 343 

U.S. 181 (l9~2). 
Irvme v. California. 347 U.s. 
128 (l954). 
1%5 
1962: Retired after 
suffering stroke. 
1965: Died at age of 
83. 
